Trinity and Creation

This analysis will first seek to investigate some key concepts in Trinitarian thought through unpacking its history on the subject of creation, and then propose some conclusions based on the contemporary work of theologians Karl Rahner and Denis Edwards with an eye toward potential conceptual challenges inherent to this line of thinking. Ultimately, the acknowledge that creation is integral to the self-definition of God as Trinity reframes subjects of Christian theology proper in a fruitful way, it should be acknowledged approched and unpacked: first, for practice as a faith community and for spiritual practice at large in its ultimate relationship to Christ, and second, for theory in that, despite the traditional challenges that may be raised to this line of thought, it opens up the possibility for more compelling conceptual framework that reverently dialogues with the deep mysteries of God. Historically, the method of integration (or more accurately, non-integration) of the Trinity and creation can be contextualized by cosmological, ontological and soteriological motivations.1 In this line of thought are Western fathers like Augustine and Aquinas. Whether or not they can be said to directly followed an Aristotelian cosmology, the fixed, Ptolemaic universe may have help to frame a more mechanistic formulation for understanding the relationship of God and creation. Augustine defended the immutability of God by clearly differentiating between God's nature and his willful act of creation. In line with other Church fathers such as Athanisius and the Cappadocians "Augustine articulates the late Nicene emphasis on God's distinction from creation through a strong emphasis on divine immateriality."2 For Augustine, the penetrating immanence of temporality throughout creation in an important premise. Temporality, for Augustine, implies mutability.3 Likewise, along with Origen, it is possible that Neoplatonic influences inspired a low view materiality and gave nonmateriality (i.e. immateriality) a higher value.4 Hence, it is vital for Augustine to delimit God's immutable, immaterial, eternality from creation's mutable, material, temporality.

Aquinas develops this further into Trinitarian light by defining the process of creation as one that is the work ad extra of an undivided, undifferentiated Trinity. Aquinas does explicate the unique involvment of each individual person which is appropriated in a given act of creation,5 however, despite Aquinas' particularly nuanced (and sometimes undervalued) understanding of the role of the Trinity in creation, every act is distinctively an act of the unified Trinity.6 Following this, in both patristic examples, the relationship between God and creation is fundamentally unifold rather than threefold. It is not "Trinitarian." In other words, creation is not integral to the self-definition of God specifically in his Trinitarianness.7 In Western thought following Augustine and Aquinas there exists an abstract, logical, causal relation8 between God as Trinity and God's uniform act of creation rather than a dynamic, tripartite, personal relation between God as Trinity and creation.9 Those who nowadays prefer Thomistic lines of thought such as Paul Molnar and Daniel Miller, attempt to reify traditional causal relations that push back against more contemporary work influenced by trends in liberation theology, process theology, modern physics and the like which theorize deeper forms of integration and threaten unorthodox views (i.e. for Molnar and Miller) of God's mutability and freedom of will. Clearly, these challenges faced even by Augustine and Aquinas, have perennial import for each subsequent generation of Trinitarian thought.

footnotes

  1. It is, in a sense, soteriological (or possibly harmartiological) because early explanations of theodicy and the origin of the relationship between "sin" and good/evil are in close theoretical proximity to the soteriological relationship between the immaterial and material and furthermore, the dualistic relationship respectively between God and creation. ↩

  2. Barnes, 79; cf. Hunt, 98; In spite of this essential agreement on the distinction between God and creation in the late Nicene fathers, it could be argued Athanasius and the Cappadocians may have developed more nuanced frameworks to allow for a more developed mystical integration. ↩

  3. Hunt, 98. This is one reason for his expression non est mundus factus in tempore, sed cum tempore. cf. Letham, 430: Colin Gunton advocates a similar Augustinian understanding of creation as an act of sovereignty, beginning in space and time, not eternal or infinte. "A trinitarian theology of creation enables the universe to be closely related to God, but free to itself." We see here, and will unpack later, the significance placed on maintaining "freedom of will" (both on behalf of God and Creation in some instances) by inserting a type of logical causality between God and His act of creation. ↩

  4. Letham, 430f. Here Letham summarizes the British, reformed, systematic Colin Gunton's interpretation of Western tradition (specifically patristic tradition) of interpreting the connection between God (i.e. Trinity) and creation. Much of his patristic interpretation is in line with that of Phan, Hunt and LaCugna. Gunton co-founded the Research Institute of Systematic Theology with fellow reformed, systematic Christophe Schwöbel in 1988. ↩

  5. Hunt, 99f ↩

  6. Hunt, 98 ↩

  7. Denis Edwards, Jesus the Wisdom of God: An Ecological Theology (New York: Maryknoll, 1995), 118. Edwards supports this reading of Augustine, its relation to the Thomistic line of thought and the Western tradition in general: "The Augustinian teaching that 'the Trinity's acts ad extra are one,' has led to the common theological position that since creation is an action of the essence of God, there is no proper role for each Person. It has been the traditional view that when we attribute a particular role in creation to one of the Persons, we do so only by 'appropriation.' This means that we attribute to one Person what really applies to all three." ↩

  8. This reoccuring Thomistic explanation for the relationship I qualify as abstract in the sense that (for us) it happens once outside of reality and therefore can't be grounded in the same actuality of the typical phenomenon/subject of theological investigation and is at; logical in the sense that it's necessary cause is grounded in an act of God's rational agency (although there may exist correlation, I don't inted this to be understood in context of the Rahnerian explanation of logical v. ontological eplanation: cf. The Trinity, 52-55); and finally, causal in a quasiAristotelian sense: God as the agent is a pseudo-necessary cause of creation—that is, only God can be the cause, but he does not have to be the cause. Typically, we this notion carries a more developed concept than Aristotle's first mover because of the personal and Trinitarian nature of God. However, it is still related in a philosophical sense. ↩

  9. Letham, 433. Explicating Colin Gunton, Letham notes the significance of "the emergence of Aristotelian influences in medieval times." While accurate in a sense, it doesn't account for the type of "logical causality" evinced in earlier patristics. ↩