On The Moral Equivalent of War and Hedges

Hedges and James are united in the general sentiment that engaging in "war" must offer humanity some value which catalyzes our recidivistic relationship with it. James, particularly in this essay, seeks to unearth what this particular "value" is, in an attempt to point toward other commensurate means of social production.¹ I assume that Hedges has a similar motivation for his journalistic reflection. Yet, Hedges and James diverge in their delimitations of this lacuna we exploit war to fill. While this is only Hedges' introduction, he focuses on the sense of meaning war offers to people (evident, of course, in the title of text). While James references this, he tends to gloss over it by chalking up this more mystical notion of "the meaning produced by war" to human imagination and machinations. Instead he prefers to focus on the instructive and formative moral powers of war for the individual and the society. Explicitly, these moral/ethical values appear to be at the forefront of James' analysis, but implicitly there are times at which this notion of "meaning" appears in the background. This idea of "meaning," particularly as Hedges refers to it, is a specter requiring elucidation within the contemporary, secular framework.²

Both of these texts point toward a variety of different facets of this meaning as they exist between people and societies. One of the most prominent is the place of "the other" in our use of "war" (or even faux-war activities such as sport) to cultivate meaning. That is, there is something to be gained by the superiority of the individual or society over some other. Always, whether it is for economic or theological purposes (i.e. imperialism and crusades respectively, and their combination), war can be depicted as something which is progress for everyone involved—"[...] taking human nature as a whole, its wars are its best protection against its weaker and more cowardly self [...]"³ Isocrates can paint Philip II's imperialism as being in Athen's best interest if only they ally and reap the rewards of his imperialistic interests; Colonial resource exploitation can be painted as the justified payment for new knowledge of the Christian God; democracy and its higher ideals can be disseminated by the destruction of defective fundamentalist "persecutors".⁴ Likewise, whether it is through the depiction of a clear other (e.g. the "black and white picture" Hedges refers to) or not, there is a type of solidarity, inspiring belonging, which in turn cultivates this meaning.⁵

Although he doesn't seem to intend it in this way, James alludes a solution to this problem of "the other" by proposing Nature as the other to be overcome through human or social unity.⁶ He focuses on the morality cultivated in light of the solidarity created in the face of this opposition. In an increasingly globalized, liberal world it is sensible to solve the problem by searching for "an other" to overcome which is not human (although, as evidenced by the political cycle of the past two years, people on both the left and right are still grossly open to the justification for discovering the "other" among humankind itself). But the question underlying remains, what is our fascination, not with war, but with the "other?" Why must "the other" perpetuate a vacuum which fills to generate both belonging, meaning and contention? Sport and game offer us socially acceptable means of satiation of the other, but satiation is not sufficient. So long as meaning and solidarity is perpetually cast in the shadow "the other," it becomes harder and harder to find these spiritual needs in and of ourselves and to belong in the world with peace, and without conflict.