On Conscientious Objectors, Incarceration, and Nonviolence
"I was no longer a citizen, I was a subject." – Osbourne1
The intended nature of a "democratic" society is to affix the state as a form to be determined (and continually determined) by its constituents—be it ethical, material2 or otherwise. A subject in a democratic society, should, in some usually historically defined sense, see themself as subject only to that which they place themself in subjection. That seems to me the different between "citizen" and "subject" in a democratic society. The citizen self-determines its nature with regard to the state, the subject's nature is determined by the state.
What then, is the role of incarceration in a democratic society? When we speak of rehabilitation, what we really refer to, is a type of subjugation of the person because they deviate from "ethical norms" of society. If we believe that these norms are in fact determined by the majority, then simply put, the role of incarceration as rehabilitation in a democratic society is to subject the prisoner to the rule of the majority. In other words, to create a subject of the majority. It is clear for a variety of reasons, how this subject formation with regard to influence of the majority or the institution (which clearly creates problems independent of the "tyranny of the majority") can have detrimental effects on the rehabilitation of the prisoner. Incarceration, in its purest essence, is recognition that deviants do not deserve "citizenship" (in that abstract sense of determination above) but subjection. The institutional nature of incarceration can only serve to enhance and reify what began as a simple relationship.
In this sense, the concern appears throughout many of these accounts, how one is to rehabilitate a person by empowering them as a citizen, rather than controlling them through subjectformation. One of the problems throughout many of these accounts, is that every other person (prisoner, guard or otherwise) sees themself first as a subject, rather than a citizen. If the warden sees himself as a subject, how can he not create other subjects. If the warden sees himself first as a citizen by recognizing the mutual rights to determination of the society, would he be more likely to create productive fellow citizens, rather than proper fellow subjects?
This is precisely what Levy and Miller are driving at when they write, "They [prison administrators], like us, are trapped in an evil system. They have chosen to defend that system; we have elected to transform it."3 Levy and Miller are "citizens"—determinants of the system in which they find themselves. Contrasted with the prison administrators, who are themselves "subjects"—destined to reify the system in which they find themselves subjugated, oriented toward creating subjects out of others. This, is also precisely what Osbourne points out: "It appears that 'the system' of incarceration, the 'administration' of the prison itself, fosters this feeling and institutes procedures that maintain its existence."4
In relation to the larger discussion of peace in this class then, our interpretations of the effects of subject-formation (on the personal and international stage) can be mapped onto the perceived relationship of violence to the nature of the institution. For example, there is a consistent parallel developed in the CO's accounts between the existence of violence in the prison as an institution, and the existence of violence in the world system. This both in the CO's personal convictions about resistance to advances from other prisoners,5 and the parallels that they draw to how the air of violence in the institution seems to reify its existence.6 In David Miller's account, he laments the anxiety of "preparedness" that accompanied the threat of violence—I can only assume he knew exactly the parallel he was drawing.
footnotes
Osbourne, 436. ↩
Marx & Engels, in The Communist Manifesto, refer to the true communist society as aspiring to "democracy" not away from it as communism is commonly understood as totalitarianism: "We have seen above, that the first step in the revolution by the working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class to win the battle of democracy." ↩
Miller, 465. ↩
Osbourne, 440 ↩
Cf. Osbourne, 443f: Osbourne calls himself the "anti-man" because he was seized by hatred and willing to act out in violence toward his aggressor. Martin Buber, in Ich und Du, says that hatred only knows partially—that is, you can only hate because you only know some partially, if you knew the whole thing (I-Thou) you could not hate. The implication being, hatred is only part of the I-It relationship. To this, Osbourne's notion of the "anti-man" is poetic in a way he may not have intended. When I define myself as a subject of the institution, both me and the institution are part of an I-It relationship. This then is the direct correlation between intrinsic subjectformation of the institution as an entity and hatred, leading to violence. Only in this dehumanizing, I-It relationship does hatred exist, and it is contrary to the true nature of what should exist, to use Buber's words, between man and man. Compare this to 'Johnson,' who seems able to avoid—what I am calling here—subject-formation, and refers a lot to the maturity (459: manhood) he gained through his prison experience, largely because of his self-awareness of what was going on. Later he writes, "To hate is to trap yourself in a way that perpetuates and gives power and recognition to what you are hating. To not stay stuck in a stifling cycle of embitterment - that's the lesson I learned in prison." We could interpret this as, 'Johnson' avoids subject-formation, and is successful therefore because he avoids hating—a notable contrast to Osbourne's experience. In regard to Cheyney's interpretation and explication of Day's view of self-immolation I wonder if this relationship between the person and the world-system may be a more helpful trajectory from which to understand the pacifist essence of burning oneself in activism. To say these actions attempt to "identify" with the dehumanization or pain of another is a step to far. One need not "identify" as though the injustice done to another person is secondary to my own existence. Rather, the self-immolator is witness to the brotherhood of man and of reality—that which we do to others, we do first to ourselves. ↩
Cf. Muste, 33: "The human being, the child of God, must assert his humanity and his sonship again. He must exercise the choice which he no longer has as something accorded him by society, which he 'naked, weaponless, armourless, without shield or spear, but only with naked hands and open eyes' must create again. He must understand that this naked human being is the one real thing in the face of the mechanics and the mechanized institutions of our age" ↩