Marx’s Premise of “the Real”

In the context of the German idealist tradition, and in the shadow of Hegel, Marx signals a shift away from the influence of "ideologies" with his focus on the "real" in The German Ideology. This analysis will begin by exploring how he uses the premise of the the "real" in opposition to the ideological priority of his contemporaries, and moreover it will explore what Marx connotes by the "real" and how he reinterprets the function of conciousness within a materialist— rather than idealist—framework. Marx begins with the premise of the real to refocus philosophical efforts to effect change (whether personal, social or political) away from unfruitful ideological priorities to more efficacious material priorities: The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions under which they live, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity.¹ Apart from representing a shift in the prevailing modes of thought in his time, accepting these insights also bears on how we understand role of conciousness in our own experience of existence.

In the opening of The German Ideology, Marx goes out of his way to qualify the differences between him and other Young Hegelians among various other predecessors and contemporaries. This analysis begins here, but the differentiation serves as a useful heuristic for understanding Marx connotation of the real. In his introduction, he introduces us to his unique premises. For Marx these premises are emphatically real and opposed to the "arbitrary," or "dogmatic" premises that he sees evinced by his ideological contemporaries. The Young Hegelians, in particular, are all guity of the same sin in Marx eyes: "Since [they] consider conceptions, thoughts, ideas, in fact all the products of conciousness, to which they attribute an independent existance, as the real chains of men [...] it is evident that [they] have to fight only against these illusions of conciousness." He does not limit this basic error of idealism to only the Young Hegelians but also to the Old Hegelians and ultimately, the Hegelian system itself. What Marx criticizes here is properly understood as idealism in that it sets people as such in a subordinate role to the products of their conciousness. Following this line of thought, the only way to overcome this problem (as Marx explains it) is to "interpret reality" in a more proper way and free oneself from the oppession of improper interpretive frameworks (e.g. religious, ideological, etc.) Marx sets himself in opposition to his contemporaries by beginning (and ultimately ending) his project withing the real.

His use of the real is first and foremost set in opposition to the premise of idealism that man's central struggle is with the products of his conciousness. Rather, the premise from which he begins are man's "activity and material conditions:" This is developed through the rest of The German Ideology as the material conditions rooted primarily in our productive capacities as corporeal beings in essence and the social/political systems which organize those productive capacities. Beginning with the real is to emphasize that Marx sees man's primary struggle as based in and confined to his materiality, and therefore, any resolution to these struggles must be material in essence rather than idealist, ideological, or even transcendental in essence.

In light of the widespread influence of idealism throughout the Western philosophical tradition—no less in this time—Marx's rejection of these fundamental premises highlight a noteworthy divergence from prevailing modes of thought. Marx emphasis on the real, however, does not outright dismiss his contemporaries focus on the products of conciousness but rather attempts to reframe them within context of the real. In opposition to his contemporaries who subordinated

reality to the labors of conciousness as such, Marx instead subordinates this conciousness to the confines of the material: Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc.— real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these up to its furthest forms. Conciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process.² And he continues, "Life is not determined by conciousness, but consciousness by life."³ There are two noteworthy ideas here that underscore how Marx defines the relationship between the consciousness and the real. The first, is that consciousness is a product of a person's existence and materiality. And second, that a person's existence is a product their material circumstances.⁴ It is important to note that these ideas do not function to wholly dismiss the role of conciousness in existence. Rather, they underscore that a person cannot change his circumstance or the circumstances of his society by theoretical deduction but only by real, actual action to alter their material circumstances.⁵ By beginning with the real as a premise, Marx nullifies the effectiveness of his ideological peers ascent toward "proper thought" as a tool to effect the circumstances of life.

Marx emphasis on the premise of the real is an objection to the ideological premises of his contemporaries and how they fail to properly address the function with which people as such alter the circumstances of their life. This movement toward a clearly articulated materialist conception of reality bears on our own understanding of the role of thought-life, spiritual ascent and contemplation in our lived experience. Marx does not invalidate the functions of conciousness and imagination. In the opening citation, he provides the example that we are capable of abstraction even if it is only a product of imagination. The ideological sterility of a function of conciousness like imagination does not necessitate its uselessness. Rather Marx, reframes these processes as tools which can be of explicit value insofar as they are capable of manifesting themselves as change in our material existence. All in all, Marx premise of the real locates our the consideration of ourselves and others (historical or contemporary) within in the reality of the given persons' material circumstances—nothing more, and yet nothing less.