## Rahner:

One of Rahner's key heuristic insights seems to be the tension between the Triunity of three hypostases in the God and the being of the Second Person which has been described in the "hypostatic union." This is terminological for one—what do we mean/imply when we say there are three *hypostases* in the Trinity and two *hypostases* on union in Christ? Likewise, what are the implications of separating the ontological/economic realities of the Logos by relying on formal constructions of his dual-personhood? These questions about the nature of the Second Person become Rahner's heuristic into further understanding the Triune God.[^1] Rahner's conflation of the economic and imminent Trinity has been criticized for failing to properly distinguish God and world. Not to say that we don't need to, but why? This issue in seems particularly subject to being answered before the question is asked. Pantheism is a threat, but what do we mean anymore when we say this?[^2] Or panentheism? The premise could become a scapegoat mired in the traditions of an outdated cosmology. How might one define "pantheism" or "panentheism" in light of a more modern cosmology? I don't find Rahner's explanation of Tritheism as a threat due to the bifurcation of the economic and immanent Trinity to be particularly compelling. Maybe if we believe orthodoxy precedes ortheopraxy? But it seems to me than any Trinitarian spiritual experience would tend toward tritheism in practice either by the nature of a limited human framework, or because of a more complex understanding of our involvement in the Trinitarian life. This begs the question: is God himself in praxis a polytheist?[^3] Rahner titles all of his discussion about the individual persons differently— *Statements about God as the Father, Statements about the Son, Statements about God as the " Spirit. "* Its probably pedantry that I find this so interesting but there is something to the way this bears on his belief in how we can comprehend the different persons of the Godhead.[^4] Sometimes it seems like Rahner sees the use of "hypostases" as threatening tritheism because it can imply different centers of activity (see p. 57, 107f) and other times he sees it as threatening modalism because of the word's historical overtones and subtle changes (see p. 75, 106). The "meaning and purpose" of Rahner's essay seems to have an underlying significance beyond just basic outline a basic methodology. It actually purports that there is a sort of commitment to orthodox or accepted modes of thought, as well as a "reverent agnosticism" (vis a vis Barth) that is important to even our systematizing of Trinitarian Doctrine.[^5]

## Other thoughts:

Does the idea that relationality is an  insufficient ontology not simply presume the traditional categories of being? Hunt writes about Schwobel: "in eschewing the dimension of substance, it effectively leaves the notion of person without metaphysical grounding." Which begs the question, why? And what type of metaphysical grounding does it require? This seems to me an uncompelling criticism of Schwobel's main points, (this isn't to say his views are ineffable). Hunt points

to Clarke to explicate two qualities of personhood: substantiality and relationality. It doesn't seem to me that this necessarily invalidates the idea that Schwobel suggests, but rather speaks to Clarkes major point—we need a more complete integration of the concepts of relationality and substantiality for a more proper ontology. That seems to be, however, what Schwobel is trying to do although it may not be complete.[^6] Even Rahner's formulation of the connectedness between the ontology of personhood and relationality seems rooted in a traditional understanding of this dichotomy that for example, *to be in relation is to infer distinct subjects of a given relation.*[^7]

One could easily see something being necessary for God as something to which God is bound— e.g. Aquinas' unwillingness to see God's act of creation as necessary. "Necessity" indicates the subordination of something to something else but the concept in this sense is incomplete. To say that God is subordinate to his own nature and character is not contradictory but implies the nature of being as such—that is, *to be* is simply to be *qua oneself*. This is not subordination of the self to the self, but rather, simply defines the fundamental nature of being. This does however add some amgiguity as to what level of self-determinance one posesses (God or Man). By suggesting that the fundamental nature of God is self-diffusive goodness, and that the Son is generated *per modum naturae* it maintains the Father as both free and bound to the necessity of His being. One could say that He is of the sort that He is in fact a captive so long as He is not bound to Himself.[^8] If we can see both freedom and necessity being marked in the first, why is it necessary to preserve the pure freedom of procession of the Spirit— *per modum voluntatis*? Why is this not then a degradation of the fullness of one's self-diffusive character from one Person to the other?[^9]

How would a Trinitarian Panenthesim relate to Marxist dialectical materialism in form and function? (We could also ask, "how does a Trinitarian Pantheism or Panentheism relate to Hegelianism?" Also its a much less Trinitarian question in function because Hegel is explicit about his metaphysics.)[^10] Could this be an extrapolation on basic idea of this thought but with an eye toward the supernatural as inseparable from the natural? One could also say, the *immaterial* as interwoven with the *material*? Marx creates for a method for thinking about life and conciousness in a materialistic (and an economic/social way) but would the addition of a supernatural facet of reality that is determinant elucidate the interaction of peoples on a more than material level? For example, the ideological level, to which Marx is for the most part opposed except in cases where products of the conciousness can indeed lead to actual changes in material circumstances. Lectio Divina for Marx could be of another of level of lunacy even more offensive that the ideological premise of his German idealist contemporaries. Does something like an *immaterial* dialectic emerge from the collision of Trinitarian panentheistic thought in the legacy of Marx's materialist philosophy?

[^1]: Karl Rahner, *The Trinity* (New York: Crossroads, 1997), 24-33, 63ff

[^2]: Ilia Delio, “Theology, Metaphysics, and the Centrality of Christ,” *Theological Studies* 68, no. 2 (2007): 254–273, at 255 n. 6.

[^3]: Rahner, 42ff, 57

[^4]: Ibid, 58-66

[^5]: Rahner, 80f

[^6]: Hunt, 68f

[^7]: Rahner 71; cf. 69ff

[^8]: Ibid., 259f; 264

[^9]: Ibid., cf. 261: "Thus, the relation between the Father and Son is the first and primal relation and the basis for all other relations."

[^10]: LaCugna, 216